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Abstract
Many European countries still provide their citizens with social insurance programs of
unprecedented generosity. A cultural critique of the welfare state contends that generous
social insurance has detrimental effects on work norms. This article revisits the model of
endogenous work ethic developed by Lindbeck and Nyberg and explores survey evidence
on the relationship between social spending and pro-work attitudes. Both theoretical and
empirical support of the cultural critique to the welfare state are found to be fragile.
Furthermore, the empirical relationship between individual work ethic and individual
income is shown to be non-monotonic, suggesting that weaker work norms needs not
harm economic performance. (JEL code: H2)
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1 Introduction
Modern welfare states came into existence following the extension of the
franchise and in the wake of the first world war. They had three main
components: social insurance programs, covering the risks of old age,
sickness, and unemployment; governmental provision of education and
health care; and progressive income taxation. Altogether, those arrange-
ments entailed a fundamental change in the rules of the game of human
life. In particular, social insurance egregiously substituted for the vanish-
ing solidarity of the extended family network and hugely improved upon
traditional assistance in form of poors’ relief offered by churches and
municipalities. The new welfare states alleviated the social burdens of
structural economic change and contributed to a more even distribution
of the fruits of scientific and technical progress.
The late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed a tremendous expansion of the
welfare state in most advanced economies, one that to many observers
seemed an excessive one. Social insurance came to cover a number of
additional risks and the level of social benefits dramatically increased.
Warnings that social policy may have gone too far multiplied.
Economists used to stress two problems. First, to the extent that social
reforms were financed by higher payroll taxes, they warned that labor
costs would increase, thereby reducing labor demand and generating
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even more unemployment. Second, by combining higher transfers for
those outside work and higher wage taxes for those in work, the expansion
of the welfare state was predicted to weaken the incentives for households
to supply labor, with a negative impact on output and public finances.
Following the welfare state expansion of the 1970s, a whole body of
research investigated the incentive costs of tax-transfer systems, both the-
oretically and empirically. While several issues are still unresolved, many
public economists seem to have subscribed to a mildly optimistic view of
the welfare state, according to which, provided it is well designed, a wel-
fare state with generous social insurance may be worthwhile despite the
incentive costs that it generates in the labor market. This view grounds on
the finding that empirically moderate reactions of labor supply—very
moderate along the intensive margin and less so along the extensive
margin—to taxes and transfers may rationalize rather generous redistribu-
tive schemes once you are ready to concede that individuals are quite risk
averse and have strong preferences for income equality.
There is, however, a big issue that is ignored by that optimistic assess-
ment: generous social insurance may seriously undermine the work ethic
of the population. When social insurance expanded about 40 years ago,
workers were imbued with the doctrine that work is a duty as long as you
are physically and mentally able to work. This may explain why major
increases in social transfers and wage taxes had limited effects on labor
supply. However, values and attitudes toward work can change from one
generation to the next. Falling returns to work as compared to living on
transfers are likely to diminish the incentives for parents to instill in their
children a belief that work is a duty, namely lack of self-reliance is some-
thing one has to be ashamed of. Such a slow-moving cultural change may
eventually destroy pro-work values and attitudes.
If correct, the cultural critique of the welfare state sketched above has
far-reaching policy implications. Governments of countries with generous
social insurance programs should partly dismantle them before the whole
system breaks down. Emerging economies, which can by now afford to
install a Western-European-style welfare state, should refrain from doing
so as the only viable model in the long run is one close to a laissez-faire
economy.
The objective of this article is to scrutinize both the theoretical and
empirical validity of the cultural critique to generous social insurance.
Section 2 offers a brief overview of the literature on the effects of the
welfare state on the work norms endorsed by the population. Section 3
revisits in some detail the main model of endogenous work norms, the one
developed by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006). I exhibit circumstances under
which that model predicts that the amount of redistribution by the welfare
state has a positive effect on the work ethic. In Section 4, I turn to the
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data. I show how self-reported work ethic has evolved in several OECD
countries during the last three decades and obtain some novel econometric
results about the effect from social insurance. The empirical evidence pro-
vides a rather weak support of the cultural critique to the welfare state.
Section 5 extends the empirical exercise to assess whether a stronger work
ethic leads to higher productivity at the individual level. Surprisingly, too
strong a work ethic is found to be harmful for economic success. Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature
Modeling the effect of the welfare state on work norms is not straightfor-
ward since the concept of work norm does not belong to the standard
toolkit of economists. The existing literature has developed models of the
work ethic understood as a norm dictating self-supportiveness, i.e. persons
who are able to work should work so as to support themselves by their
own work and they should not rely on support by others, e.g. the govern-
ment. Violation of that norm is assumed to generate a disutility, both
because of feelings of guilt and because of social sanctions associated
with one’s loss of reputation. The main idea is that the stronger the
work ethic endorsed by people, the larger is the utility loss from breaking
the work norm.
In Lindbeck (1997) and Lindbeck et al. (1999, 2003), the disutility from
deviation from the work norm is simply assumed to decrease with the
share of transfer recipients.1 Transfer recipients may either be people
who cannot work or people who choose to live off the welfare state.
Since transfer recipients may be individuals who themselves break the
norm, those models exhibit the critical-mass effect popularized by
Shelling (1971). The larger the share of the population that violates the
norm, the smaller the utility loss from violating it, and the stronger the
incentive to live off handouts from the government. Thus, there can be
both an equilibrium with large norm compliance and large individual costs
in case of deviating from the norm, and one where the norm breaks down
in terms of both behavior and social sanctions. In such a framework, an
exogenous increase in the generosity of the welfare state or a sudden deep
recession may eliminate the good equilibrium and lead to the collapse of
the work norm and the welfare state itself.
A main contribution of the papers quoted above is to model the gener-
osity of the welfare state as the outcome of a political process. This can
eliminate equilibrium multiplicity. Lindbeck et al. (1999) show that under
1 See also Lindbeck (1995a, b).
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majority voting there exists at most one equilibrium: either a laissez-faire
one, supported by a majority of potential taxpayers, or one with a gener-
ous welfare state, supported by a majority of transfer recipients. The
laissez-faire equilibrium is one where the norm is vastly obeyed and the
work ethic is strong, whereas the work ethic is weak in the welfare-state
equilibrium.
In the papers discussed above, the modeling of the work ethic is rather
crude. The work norm is formally equivalent to a network externality
where the utility from adopting the ‘good behavior’ increases with the
share of adopters. This is not very satisfactory in view of the evaluative
stance associated with the work ethic. That dimension of norms was
already stressed by Akerlof (1980) who in his theory of social custom
posited that the disutility from breaking the norm increases with the
share of those who believe in the norm.2 Moreover, neither Akerlof’s
model of social custom nor the above models of work norms can explain
the existence of the norm; they can only explain its stability and intensity.
Microfoundations for the existence of a work norm have been proposed
by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006). Their approach will be presented in some
details in the next Section. Its distinctive trait is to model work norms as
the outcome of a purposive socialization process by which parents raise
their children to work hard. The underlying idea is that it is in the parents’
interest to instill a work ethic in their children so as to prevent children’s
free-riding on parents’ altruism. The existence of work norms is explained
by parents’ incentive to counteract their children’s opportunism.
The welfare state may affect the incentive for parents to instill a work
norm. Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) analyze the case of a social insurance
program that redistributes income among all children, once they have
become adults. If social insurance supports children without own
market income, some of the costs of children’s free riding are shifted
from the parents to the government, so that the incentive for the parents
to instill a work norm diminishes. However, the redistributive effect of
social insurance further distorts downwards the effort of children, which
might worsen the conflict of interest between parents and children and
lead parents to instill a stricter work ethic. Lindbeck and Nyberg exhibit
circumstances under which the first effect prevails and a more generous
social insurance reduces the work ethic.3
2 In turn, the share of believers was assumed to increase if in the previous period the share
of those who complied with the norm was larger than the share of those who believed in
the norm.
3 Differently from the models mentioned above, in the current one the welfare state is
exogenous. There is a constant marginal tax rate and a benefit for those out of work
such that the government’s budget is balanced.
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Two theoretical papers spurred by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) are
Corneo (2011) and Gradstein (2010). Both papers deal with the link
between social insurace and work ethic but they do not view the conflict
between parents and children as key. Rather, they posit aligned interests
and stress parents’ incentives to instill values that favor a way of behaving
that is likely to confer esteem and self-respect upon their children. Corneo
(2011) is concerned with rentier states that mainly redistribute their oil
revenues through unproductive jobs in the public sector. These are often
countries where pro-work attitudes are relatively weak. A simple model
shows that the work ethic can be strengthened if that inefficient method of
redistributing the oil rent is replaced by a social inheritance given to every
citizen entering adulthood.
Gradstein’s (2010) model is motivated by the observation that across
countries, social insurance and governmental involvement in education are
highly correlated. This suggests that public education may be an optimal
response to the underinvestment in human capital associated with social
insurance. Gradstein’s model shows that with endogenous work norms,
education subsidies may also help to alleviate the deterioration of those
norms. Hence, countries with larger social insurance may not have a
weaker work ethic if they manage to have more generous education
policies.
So far, there has not been much empirical research trying to assess the
effect of the welfare state on the work ethic of the population. Two main
empirical strategies have been tried. One strategy is to measure the work
ethic of individuals indirectly, trying to infer it from their behavior, e.g.
their labor supply. This is the approach followed by Mulligan (1997), who
examines welfare participation in the USA, and Ljunge (2010), who ana-
lyzes the take up of sick leave benefits in Sweden. Both papers exhibit
findings that are consistent with the view that generous social insurance
tends to erode the work ethic of the population. The main problem of this
approach is the impossibility to exclude that the observed behavioral
changes be caused by non-observable factors other than work norms.
The other strategy consists of measuring the work ethic directly by
means of survey questions. This is the approach followed by Lindbeck
and Nyberg (2006) who use data from the World Value Surveys. For a
subset of OECD countries, they find a negative correlation between a
self-reported pro-work attitude and the share of social expenditure to
GDP. Also this approach, which will be pursued in Section 4, is not with-
out difficulties. One is the lack of uniformity in survey design and admin-
istration across countries, which hampers cross-country comparisons.
Furthermore, respondents may tend to answer according to what is per-
ceived as ‘politically correct’. They may also report attitudes that are
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congruent with their work situation, just in order to reduce cognitive
dissonance.4
While this article concentrates on the effect of the welfare state on the
work ethic, a related issue which has received some attention in the litera-
ture is the effect of the welfare state on benefit morale, i.e. refraining from
claiming government benefits to which one is not entitled. In a study based
on data from the World Value Surveys, Heinemann (2008) reports that an
increase in the social benefits over the preceding 20 years is associated with
lower benefit morale today; he also finds that later birth cohorts have
lower levels of benefit morale. The latter finding has, however, been dis-
puted by Halla et al. (2010).
3 The Lindbeck-Nyberg model
I now revisit in some detail the main model of endogenous work norms,
the one developed by Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006). That paper exhibits
circumstances under which the amount of governmental redistribution
dampens the work ethic of the population; in this way, it offers a rationale
for a cultural critique of the welfare state.
3.1 Assumptions and main result
The model by Lindbeck and Nyberg portrays a population of families,
each formed by a parent (she) and a child (he). The parent has an exogen-
ous income and cares about own consumption and her child’s utility. The
parent’s utility reads
Up ¼ ln cp þ Uk: ð1Þ
The parent can donate some of her exogenous income I to her child. The
child does not care about the utility of the parent. The child exerts effort
which determines the probability to be successful in the labor market.
There are two possible labor market outcomes: the high wage wh and
the low wage wl (possibly zero). The child cares about own effort, con-
sumption, and shame:
Uk ¼ ln ck  vðpÞ  dks; ð2Þ
where p is both the effort level and the probability to succeed in the labor
market, v(p)¼qln (1 p) is increasing and convex, q>0 is a parameter,
and dk equals 1 if the child turns out to fail in the labor market and it
4 An account of critical issues when using subjective survey data is offered by Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001).
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equals 0 otherwise. Variable s 0 stands for the shame level in case of not
being self-reliant and captures the work ethic of the child.
The sequence of events is as follows: first, the parent transmits a work
ethic s; second, the child exerts effort; third, Nature determines the child’s
wage; fourth, wages are redistributed according to a balanced social insur-
ance scheme; fifth, the parent chooses how much income to donate to her
child. Social insurance has a constant marginal tax rate t and a benefit B
for those who failed in the labor market. Those two parameters are related
through the government’s budget constraint:
t wh þ ð1 Þwl  ¼ ð1 ÞB; ð3Þ
where  is the fraction of individuals in the good state. In case of ex-ante
identical families, ¼ p ex post.
In this model, the child anticipates the help of his parent and therefore
exerts less effort than in her absence. Between the parent and the child
there is a divergence of interests with respect to the level of effort: the
parent prefers a higher level of effort than her child. This feature hinges on
the one-way altruism assumption. For both the child and the parent, the
marginal cost of effort is given by its marginal disutility v0. The marginal
benefit from higher effort depends on how much it raises the expected
utility from consumption by increasing the probability to switch from the
bad state to the good state. For the child, that utility differential only
includes the difference in own utility from own consumption. For the
altruist parent, it includes both the child’s difference in utility and the
one due to the change in own consumption. Hence, as soon as the parent’s
consumption in the good state is higher than in the bad state—which is the
case as soon as the parent’s gift is larger in the bad state than in the good
state—the parent prefers a higher level of effort than the amount chosen
by her child. It is this conflict of interest which may make the parent
willing to harm her child by instilling a shame level s>0 for failure in
the labor market: the larger s, the larger the utility differential between
good and bad states and the greater the child’s effort.
The optimal level of work ethic s from the parent’s perspective weights
its incentive effect against the child’s expected utility loss from feeling
more shame. The parent only instills a strictly positive amount of work
ethic if the child’s effort choice is much lower than the parent’s preferred
level. Poor parents who donate nothing to their children even in case of a
low wage do not prefer a higher effort and therefore set s equal to zero.
The same lack of work ethic obtains if the income of the parent is so low
that she only donates a little bit, since the effort distortion has a
second-order effect. Sufficiently rich parents with large gifts to children
set instead s>0.
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Social insurance decreases the income received in the good state by the
child and it increases the income he receives in the bad state. As long as
some inequality persists, it remains true that parents prefer a higher level
of effort than their children. However, social insurance changes the
amount donated by parents to their children. Children with bad outcomes
receive less and children with good outcomes receive more. Hence, social
insurance indirectly reduces also consumption inequality among all
parents.5
The main result in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) is about the compara-
tive statics of the work ethic associated with a marginal change in the tax
rate under budget-balanced social insurance:
Proposition 1: Assume that, in equilibrium, all parents financially support
their children even when the latter earn the high wage. Then, a marginal
increase of the tax rate leads to a weaker work ethic (ds/dt<0).
Proof: see the proof of Proposition 4 in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006).
This result may be interpreted as demonstrating the existence of a
long-term negative effect of the welfare state on work incentives. If parents
correctly anticipate that their children’s social insurance will be more
redistributive, they will instill weaker work norms. A reform that makes
social insurance today more generous and that is permanent may have
small effects on incentives today, because the work ethic of the current
generation is already fixed and more redistribution by the government is
partly outdone by less redistribution by parents. However, more generous
social insurance may have large effects on future work norms because the
values of the next generation have not crystallized yet. Thus, the long-run
costs of the welfare state in terms of foregone GDP may be much larger
than commonly thought.
3.2 An additional result
The main result in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) applies to parameter
constellations such that in equilibrium parents give a financial aid to
their children both in the case of failure in the labor market and in the
5 Notice that parents’ incomes are not directly affected by social insurance in this model.
This is not very satisfactory if one sees this model as a shortcut for a dynamic one where
also the children will have their own children. In such an encompassing model, the income
of parents will be more equally distributed if there is a social insurance scheme. This
would have distinctive effects on parents’ incentives to instill a work ethic (it may be
conjectured that rich parents instill more work ethic if they are less rich and poor parents
instill more work ethic if they are less poor).
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case of success. For parameter constellations such that parents only sup-
port children with a low wage, the following fact can be established.
Proposition 2: Assume that, in equilibrium, only children who fail in the
labor market receive a financial aid from their parents. If the tax rate is
sufficiently close to the one that maximizes tax revenue, a marginal increase
of the tax rate leads to a stronger work ethic (ds/dt>0).
Proof: see the Appendix A.
In order to understand this result, it is useful to separate the effect of
higher taxes from that of a higher benefit. So, suppose that the budgetary
consequences of dt>0 or dB>0 merely affect the governmental provi-
sion of a public good that enters separately the utility function. If only the
benefit is increased, the utility differential between the two states decreases
and the child exerts less effort. Also the altruistic parent desires a lower
effort level. However, since in equilibrium the parent is only donating in
case of the bad state, this effect is stronger for the parent than for the
child: the decrease in the effort desired by the parent is larger than the
decrease in the effort chosen by the child. Then, it is optimal for the parent
to diminish the level of shame inflicted upon the child in case of bad luck.
As a result, a larger benefit brings about a weaker work ethic. In case of a
tax-rate increase, the effect is instead stronger for the child than for the
parent, since the parent is not donating in case of the good state. Thus,
the parent optimally increases the level of shame so as to counteract the
disincentive effect from heavier taxation: a higher tax rate brings about a
stronger work ethic.
In the neighborhood of the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue, a
marginal increase of the tax rate has no first-order effect on the benefit in a
budget-balanced social insurance scheme. Therefore, a more redistributive
social insurance influences the work ethic only through the tax-rate effect,
which is to say that it strenghtens the work ethic.
4 Work ethic and social spending in the data
The World Values Survey and the European Values Study—hereafter
jointly referrred to as WVS—constitute a rich source of information
about endorsed values. The WVS covers a large number of countries
since 1981 and has been conducted in six waves. The work ethic of
respondents can be captured by their answers to a survey question that
has been asked in all six waves, which allows one to examine its evolution
over a time span of almost three decades. The survey question reads: ‘Here
is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home.
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Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose
up to five.’ One of the qualities in the list is ‘Hard work’. This allows one
to construct a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the respondent men-
tioned hard work as important and 0 otherwise. In the following, I call
that variable ‘Hard work’ and intrepret it as an indicator of a strong work
ethic. That variable is the same one that Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006)
employed in the empirical part of their paper.
4.1 Evolution of self-reported work ethic
Has the work ethic of the population eroded in countries that
experienced a substantial expansion of the welfare state until the late
1970s? Figures 1–4 plot the shares of pro-work respondents in four
groups of countries as inferred from the WVS question mentioned
above. Apparently, there is no sign of a declining work ethic in any of
those countries. Since 1981, the share of those who believe hard work to be
important has been rather stable or it has increased, like in Italy and the
Anglosaxon countries.
The pattern exhibited by Figures 1–4 remains largely unchanged if one
looks at distinctive population subgroups. Thus, while the male popula-
tion consistently displays a larger share of pro-work respondents than the
female population, the evolution of the work ethic since the 1980s has been
very similar for men and women. Also across age groups and education
levels, the evolution of self-reported work ethic in each country has been
very similar to the evolution observed for its entire population.
It is noteworthy that the shares of pro-work respondents widely differ
across countries. For instance, the share in France is about twice as large
as the share in Germany. Arguably, such differences do not mirror real
differences in average attitudes; rather, they may be mainly due to the
translation of the expression ‘Hard work’ in the various languages.
Thus, while Germans are asked about the value of ‘Hart arbeiten’,
French are asked about ‘L’application au travail’, which has a much
less severe connotation.6 While using the variable ‘Hard work’ to compare
the strength of work norms across countries can be misleading, that vari-
able proves helpful in order to assess the evolution of work norms within
countries over time.
6 Another example is Portugal, a country with a very high share of pro-work respondents.
There, people are asked about the value of ‘Ser trabalhador’, which suggests diligence and
caring about work rather than hard working.
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I focus on OECD countries.7 The WVS data can be combined with aggre-
gate country data to investigate whether changes in the generosity of social
insurance correlate with country-specific changes in the strength of the
work ethic. In what follows, individual work attitudes measured by the
Figure 1 Share of respondents who emphasize hard work in Anglosaxon
countries.
Figure 2 Share of respondents who emphasize hard work in Nordic countries.
7 All countries that are current members of the OECD are included in the regressions, with
the exception of Hungary and Poland. For those two countries, the survey item capturing
the work ethic seems to suffer from a serious problem of inconsistent wording or inaccur-
ate coding across waves. I have also excluded from the last wave Turkey because the
hard-work variable is clearly unreliable (it equals 1 for all respondents).
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dummy variable ‘Hard work’ are regressed on social expenditure as a
percentage of GDP in the respondent’s country in the year of the survey.
Estimation results for four logit regressions are reported in Table 1. All
specifications include an unreported constant as well as unreported
country-dummies that control for highly significant unobserved country-
specific factors. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country of
the respondent.8 The first regression only includes as individual controls
the respondent’s age, gender, family status and whether the respondent’s
household includes children. The second equation adds the respondent’s
Figure 3 Share of respondents who emphasize hard work in Continental
European countries.
Figure 4 Share of respondents who emphasize hard work in Southern European
countries.
8 See Moulton (1990).
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Table 1 Binary logit regressions for the emphasis on hard work
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social spending/ GDP 0.060* 0.028 0.010 0.040
(2.16) (0.57) (-0.12) (-0.82)
Age 0.016*** 0.001 0.001 0.002
(3.46) (0.29) (0.13) (0.31)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.44) (1.62) (1.45) (1.31)
Female 0.290*** 0.337*** 0.345*** 0.352***
(6.95) (7.58) (6.78) (6.82)
Legal status
– married 0.024 0.010 0.004 0.019
(0.64) (0.29) (0.12) (0.48)
– divorced 0.112** 0.096 0.092 0.101
(2.80) (1.94) (1.66) (1.71)
– widowed 0.035 0.044 0.050 0.042
(0.63) (0.80) (0.82) (0.61)
Children 0.021 0.049 0.050 0.050
(0.43) (1.10) (1.09) (1.11)
Primary income source
– Part time work 0.006 0.003 0.008
(0.12) (0.06) (0.15)
– Self-employed 0.040 0.028 0.036
(0.72) (0.53) (0.59)
– Retired 0.021 0.011 0.021
(0.44) (0.21) (0.42)
– Housewife 0.041 0.024 0.043
(0.82) (0.46) (0.77)
– Student 0.018 0.055 0.057
(0.37) (0.99) (1.02)
– Unemployed 0.033 0.064 0.080
(0.62) (1.17) (1.51)
– Other 0.116 0.184 0.154*
(1.27) (1.95) (2.39)
Education
– Primary education 0.164 0.149 0.158*
(1.95) (1.72) (2.08)
– Some secondary education 0.331*** 0.315*** 0.323***
(3.94) (3.58) (3.76)
– Secondary education 0.413*** 0.411*** 0.414***
(5.26) (4.83) (4.73)
– Tertiary education 0.402*** 0.390*** 0.398***
(3.78) (3.47) (3.98)
Income inequality 0.117*** 0.101***
(3.86) (2.74)
Log real GDP per capita 0.337 3.461*
(0.41) (2.44)
Unemployment rate 0.016 0.072
(0.55) (1.54)
Real GDP growth rate 0.063 0.086
(1.16) (1.80)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No No No Yes
Observations 124 969 77 821 69 138 69 138
t-Statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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job status and educational attainment—two variables that may be
endogenous to the respondent’s work ethic. The third equation adds the
following macroeconomic controls: the Gini coefficient of the distribution
of household adult-equivalent net income, the natural logarithm of
per-capita GDP in real terms, the unemployment rate, and the annual
growth rate of real GDP.9 The fourth specification adds year fixed effects
for the year in which the survey was conducted.
Table 1 provides an insight into the effect from country-specific changes
in the generosity of social insurance over time on the work ethic of indi-
viduals living in that country. The relative size of social insurance has
some explanatory power of the work ethic of individuals in the first regres-
sion, but the estimated coefficient has the wrong sign: increases in social
expenditure come together with a wider endorsement of work norms.
Including additional individual controls and macroeconomic controls
makes the estimated coefficients on the social insurance variable statistic-
ally insignificant. If one additionally controls for the year when the survey
was conducted, a coefficient with the expected sign obtains. However, the
coefficient is not significant at the 10% level.10
In columns (2)–(4) of Table 1, about 40% of the sample is lost because
of missing information about respondents’ education. Specifically, educa-
tional attainment is almost entirely missing from the first two waves of the
WVS. In order to keep those observations in the regressions, I have
adopted specifications that replicate those in Table 1 but drop the educa-
tion dummies and instead include year fixed effects. Results are shown in
Table 2. Social expenditure carries a negative coefficient but its effect is
very small and not significant.
Restricting the sample to the Anglosaxon and the Western-European
countries does not produce qualitatively different results. Also replacing
current social expenditure with social expenditure 10 or 20 years before the
survey was conducted does not yield statistically significant results.
Possibly, social expenditure as a share of GDP is not a good proxy of
the generosity of the welfare state. Thus, I also tried to replace it with an
index of generosity calculated by political scientists for a subset of OECD
countries.11 Results remained qualitatively similar to those reported in the
tables here.
9 The Gini coefficients are taken from the Standardized World Income Inequality
Database, while the remaining macro variables are OECD data.
10 Household income is not controlled for in the regressions of Table 1 because income
should be endogenous to the work ethic, see Section 5, and because plenty of observa-
tions are missing. Adding household income to the regression equations in Tables 1 and 2
leaves the results about the effect from social expenditure qualitatively unaffected.
11 See Scruggs and Allan (2006). Their generosity index captures the ratio of the after-tax
benefit payable to a typical worker to that worker’s after-tax wage.
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Table 2 Binary logit regressions for the emphasis on hard work
(1) (2) (3)
Social spending/ GDP 0.002 0.005 0.009
(0.10) (0.21) (0.28)
Age 0.016*** 0.014** 0.014**
(3.72) (3.24) (2.93)
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.66) (0.23) (0.21)
Female 0.298*** 0.320*** 0.339***
(6.69) (7.62) (7.16)
Legal status
– married 0.004 0.013 0.032
(0.13) (0.40) (1.05)
– divorced 0.109** 0.108** 0.129**
(2.62) (2.63) (3.01)
– widowed 0.075 0.080 0.067
(1.32) (1.52) (1.18)
Children 0.013 0.016 0.065
(0.26) (0.33) (1.50)
Primary income source
– Part time work 0.046 0.029
(1.22) (0.80)
– Self-employed 0.031 0.014
(0.62) (0.29)
– Retired 0.024 0.010
(0.58) (0.21)
– Housewife 0.041 0.074
(0.76) (1.46)
– Student 0.044 0.056
(0.85) (1.00)
– Unemployed 0.016 0.017
(0.33) (0.35)








Real GDP growth rate 0.001
(0.02)
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 124 969 122 333 111 073
t-Statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01,***P<0.001.
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Summing up, I find that survey-based evidence in support of the cultural
critique of the welfare state rests on rather shaky grounds. Changes over
time in the relative size and generosity of social insurance in the various
countries seem to have at best a small impact on the work ethic of their
populations.12
If one uses the data to conduct a cross-country analysis, emphasis on
hard work and social spending appear to be negatively correlated. Figure 5
exhibits a scatter plot of country-specific work ethic and social insurance.
The work ethic of a country is proxied by the coefficient on the corres-
ponding country dummy taken from regression (4) in Table 1. The gen-
erosity of social insurance in a country is proxied by the average ratio of
social spending to GDP in that country in the period from 1999 to 2007. A
possible interpretation of the pattern in Figure 5 is that it mirrors equi-
librium multiplicity. Countries may be characterized by different national
cultures that make them coordinate on different combinations of work
norms and social insurance.
Figure 5 Emphasis on hard work and social spending in OECD countries.
12 Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) find instead that social spending significantly decreases the
probability of mentioning hard work as an important quality. That difference is due to
various differences in sample and specification. Among other things, they only use the
first three waves of WVS, they eliminate former socialist countries and only consider
respondents with one child, and they do not employ country dummies. If country dum-
mies are omitted from the regressions in Tables 1 and 2 of this article, social spending
carries a statistically significant negative coefficient.
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5 The missing gain from a strong work ethic
Interest about the effect of social insurance on the work ethic of individ-
uals mainly derives from the presumption that individuals with a weaker
work ethic contributes less to production, national income, and tax rev-
enue. Conversely, a stronger work ethic is expected to lead individuals to
devote a larger share of their time and energy to work, thereby increasing
labor supply and output; individuals with a stronger work ethic are
expected to expend more effort in job search and to end up receiving
higher incomes and paying more taxes and contributions. The WVS
data can be used to investigate to what extent that presumption is corro-
borated by the evidence.
The WVS only contains information about the annual household
income of respondents. That income information is collected in country-
specific categories that can be used to assign each respondent to a quintile
of the income distribution of that respondent’s country in the year of the
survey. I employ the respondent’s quintile in the income distribution as a
proxy for a respondent’s productivity and examine how the probability of
being in the various quintiles of the income distribution is affected by the
respondent’s work ethic.
Respondents in the early stage or in the late stage of their lifecycles often
receive annual incomes that are not representative of their permanent
income, which is the measure of individual productivity one is especially
interested in. However, as shown by the literature on the lifecycle vari-
ation in the association between annual and lifetime income, annual
income when aged between 35 and 55 is a reliable proxy of permanent
income.13 Therefore, I restrict the sample to respondents in that age
bracket. Furthermore, since the regressions presented in the previous
Section indicate that gender has a strong effect on the self-reported
work ethic, I run separate regressions for male and for female respondents.
For the sake of brevity, only regressions for the male population are pre-
sented; results for the female respondents are similar.
Table 3 shows estimates from four-ordered logit regressions. All regres-
sion equations include a constant, country fixed effects and year fixed
effects; standard errors are adjusted for clustering by country of the
respondent. The first regression only includes as individual controls the
respondent’s age and family status. The second equation include dummies
for the number of children in the respondent’s household. The third equa-
tion adds the respondent’s educational attainment and the fourth one
further adds the respondent’s job status.
13 See e.g. Bjo¨rklund (1993), Bo¨nke et al. (2012) and Haider and Solon (2006).
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Table 3 Ordered logit regressions for income quintile of male respondents aged
35–55 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Hard work 0.171*** 0.166*** 0.040 0.071
(3.93) (3.80) (0.89) (1.47)
Age 0.127*** 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.109*
(4.36) (5.05) (3.37) (2.52)
Age squared 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*
(4.54) (5.14) (3.33) (2.26)
Legal status
– married 1.147*** 1.154*** 1.145*** 1.018***
(8.85) (9.87) (9.03) (8.08)
– divorced 0.063 0.053 0.013 0.027
(0.92) (0.66) (0.16) (0.35)
– widowed 0.102 0.101 0.128 0.191
(1.01) (0.91) (0.89) (1.19)
Number of children
– 1 child 0.089 0.156 0.170
(1.12) (1.72) (1.85)
– 2 children 0.170* 0.216* 0.182
(2.00) (2.35) (1.93)
– 3 children 0.034 0.136 0.130
(0.34) (1.31) (1.25)
– 4 or more children 0.312** 0.152 0.118
(2.64) (1.41) (1.10)
Education
– Primary education 0.739*** 0.707***
(5.48) (4.07)
– Some secondary education 1.370*** 1.287***
(9.30) (7.00)
– Secondary education 2.143*** 1.996***
(14.37) (10.10)
– Tertiary education 2.971*** 2.800***
(16.32) (12.15)
Primary income source














Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 27 968 26 920 18 630 18 154
t-Statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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A respondent’s work ethic is proxied by the dummy variable ‘Hard
work’ described above. Surprisingly, a strong work ethic is found to
decrease the probability of ranking high in the income distribution. The
negative impact of one’s work ethic on one’s income is strongly significant
in the regressions employed for columns 1 and 2 in Table 3. However, if
one controls for a respondent’s education and job status, the effect from
the work ethic becomes statistically insignificant.
The last three waves of the WVS contain two additional items that can
be used in order to construct two further proxies of a respondent’s work
ethic. They can be used to gain further insights and to check the robust-
ness of the negative results shown in Table 3. Specifically, respondents
were asked whether they agree with the following two statements: ‘It is
humiliating to receive money without having to work for it’ and ‘Work is a
duty towards society’. Respondents could choose ‘Strongly agree’, ‘Agree’,
‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Disagree’ or ‘Strongly disagree’. From each
question, one can derive dummy variables that capture the strength of the
respondent’s work ethic. I call ‘Money-work 5’ a dummy that equals one if
the respondent strongly agrees with the statement that it is humiliating to
receive money without having to work for it and zero otherwise;
‘Money-work 4’ equals one if the respondent agrees with the same state-
ment, whereas ‘Money-work 3’, ‘Money-work 2’, and ‘Money-work 1’
respectively refer to ‘Neither agree nor disagree’, ‘Disagree’, and
‘Strongly disagree’. In an analogous way, I construct dummies for the
work ethic as inferred from answers to the question about work as a
duty toward society.
Table 4 replicates the regressions of Table 3 except for replacing
‘Hard work’ with the proxies of the work ethic from the question about
the humiliation from not being self-reliant. The reference category is the
middle category ‘Money-work 3’. The estimation results suggest that the
relationship between the strength of the work ethic and the income level is
non-monotonic: at low levels, a strengthening of the respondent’s work
ethic tends to increase a respondent’s income, but at high levels, a further
strengthening of the respondent’s work ethic tends to decrease a respond-
ent’s income.
A similar pattern emerges when using the proxies derived from reactions
to the statement about work as a duty toward society. Results exhibited in
Table 5 suggest that both a very weak and a very strong work ethic are
associated with a low income.
The interpretation of those findings is far from obvious. On the one
hand, one may contend that self-reported work ethic is not a good
proxy for the respondent’s true work ethic. In particular, low-income
respondents may fall into one of two categories: those who report a
very strong work ethic to signal that they are not lazy and those who
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Table 4: Ordered logit regressions for income quintile of male respondents aged
35–55 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Money-work 1 0.161** 0.171*** 0.206*** 0.093
(3.15) (3.54) (4.08) (1.75)
Money-work 2 0.047 0.071 0.082 0.050
(0.93) (1.57) (1.84) (1.00)
Money-work 4 0.032 0.035 0.018 0.008
(0.68) (0.73) (0.37) (0.15)
Money-work 5 0.215*** 0.227*** 0.114* 0.127*
(3.74) (4.08) (2.01) (2.31)
Age 0.065 0.080 0.119* 0.058
(1.39) (1.73) (2.52) (1.28)
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001
(1.54) (1.86) (2.46) (1.05)
Legal status
 married 1.162*** 1.075*** 1.044*** 0.927***
(7.63) (7.30) (6.67) (6.13)
 divorced 0.085 0.002 0.033 0.015
(1.05) (0.02) (0.34) (0.16)
 widowed 0.081 0.171 0.034 0.035
(0.56) (1.27) (0.25) (0.21)
Number of children
 1 child 0.141 0.189* 0.180*
(1.65) (1.98) (2.03)
 2 children 0.236* 0.292** 0.247*
(2.26) (2.62) (2.19)
 3 children 0.084 0.239* 0.204*
(0.81) (2.23) (1.96)
 4 or more children 0.287 0.014 0.029
(1.94) (0.10) (0.21)
Education
 Primary education 0.880*** 0.866***
(4.10) (3.78)
 Some secondary education 1.633*** 1.567***
(6.44) (5.66)
 Secondary education 2.385*** 2.263***
(9.21) (8.19)
 Tertiary education 3.245*** 3.103***
(11.52) (10.21)
(continued)
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report a very low work ethic to proclaim that there laziness needs not be
excused. The finding that both a very strong and a very weak self-reported
work ethic come along with low income may also be driven by a simple
correlation between work ethic and social classes. The majority of
respondents with low incomes may belong to the working class and
hard work may be a distinctive value of the working class. The remaining
low-income respondents may belong to what some sociologists call the
underclass. This includes individuals who choose not to take jobs, who
receive welfare benefits and sporadically work in the black economy, and
it includes habitual criminals. Low-income respondents from the under-
class may be the ones with a distinctively weak work ethic.
On the other hand, one may try to figure out channels through which a
very strong work ethic could really be harmful for income generation. A
first possible channel is an individual’s labor supply entering a range
where marginal labor productivity is negative. Individuals with a very
strong work ethic may be compulsive workers whose overwork causes
them health problems—ranging from exhaustion to high blood pres-
sure—that eventually undermine their ability to generate income. A
second possibility is that overwork implies less time for social interactions,
including word-of-mouth communication about job and income
Table 4: Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary income source














Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13 314 12 889 12 818 12 758
t-Statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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Table 5 Ordered logit regressions for income quintile of male respondents aged
35–55 years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Work-duty 1 0.119* 0.113* 0.055 0.035
(2.31) (2.20) (1.25) (0.77)
Work-duty 2 0.108 0.104 0.136* 0.104
(1.83) (1.69) (2.40) (1.89)
Work-duty 4 0.185*** 0.165** 0.149* 0.184**
(3.77) (3.16) (2.34) (2.81)
Work-duty 5 0.255** 0.241* 0.343** 0.246**
(2.63) (2.49) (3.28) (3.16)
Age 0.062 0.077 0.117* 0.057
(1.38) (1.73) (2.55) (1.28)
Age squared 0.001 0.001 0.001* 0.001
(1.54) (1.87) (2.51) (1.07)
Legal status
 married 1.163*** 1.075*** 1.042*** 0.927***
(7.53) (7.32) (6.70) (6.11)
 divorced 0.087 0.001 0.030 0.014
(1.05) (0.01) (0.31) (0.15)
 widowed 0.076 0.176 0.049 0.009
(0.52) (1.33) (0.36) (0.06)
Number of children
 1 child 0.143 0.190* 0.183*
(1.66) (2.00) (2.04)
 2 children 0.241* 0.296** 0.252*
(2.28) (2.63) (2.22)
 3 children 0.083 0.237* 0.205*
(0.80) (2.22) (1.98)
 4 or more children 0.297* 0.003 0.018
(1.97) (0.02) (0.13)
Education
 Primary education 0.878*** 0.849***
(4.27) (3.91)
 Some secondary education 1.641*** 1.564***
(6.64) (5.85)
 Secondary education 2.386*** 2.254***
(9.52) (8.53)
 Tertiary education 3.249*** 3.096***
(11.88) (10.60)
(continued)
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opportunities. A third possible channel is that an excessive emphasis on
having a job may induce too little risk taking. The obsession of always
being self-reliant may lead individuals to avoid risky careers, possibly
sacrifying their personal talent for an occupation if the perceived risk of
personal failure is relatively large. Similarly, when unemployed, those indi-
viduals may take up the first possible job, foresaking the uncertain oppor-
tunity of getting a more lucrative one by waiting longer.
6 Conclusion
According to a cultural critique, a welfare state with generous social insur-
ance is likely to destroy its own moral basis, i.e. those work norms that are
necessary to motivate workers when wage taxes and unemployment bene-
fits are high. While plausible and potentially important, that critique is
more fragile than it appears. The cultural critique to the welfare state can
be rationalized in theoretical models with optimizing agents. However, as
shown in this article, there are counterveiling forces and in some circum-
stances a more generous welfare state is predicted by theory to strengthen
the work ethic of the population. Thus, whether the cultural critique is
Table 5 Continued
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Primary income source














Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13 328 12 904 12 833 12 771
t-Statistics in parentheses: *P<0.05, **P<0.01, ***P<0.001.
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well taken or not is to a large extent an empirical issue. This article has
presented some new evidence about it, based on survey data from the
OECD countries over the last three decades. With country fixed effects,
an increase of social spending as a fraction of GDP is found to have no
statistically significant effect on the probability that individuals report a
strong work ethic. Across countries, there is a negative correlation
between social spending and self-reported work ethic.
From an economic viewpoint, the main reason to be worried about a
weak work ethic is its effect upon productivity. This article has empirically
explored the link between work norms and income at the individual level.
In contrast with existing models and simple intuition, income is not
positively correlated with pro-work attitudes in the data. Rather, the rela-
tionship between income and work ethic has the form of an inverted U:
both a very weak and a very strong work ethic are found to decrease the
probability of ranking high in the income distribution. This finding sug-
gests that even if rolling back the welfare state does increase the strength
of work norms, income needs not increase as a consequence.
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A1. Proof of Proposition 2
Without significant loss of generality, assume that all families are ex-ante
identical and that the equilibrium has the property that only children with
low wage receive a gift both before and after the marginal increase of the




which is Equation (9) in Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006), henceforth LN.
Using Equation (3) in LN, one has
eck ¼ ð1þ Þð1 tÞwh
½Iþ ð1 tÞwl þ B
and
ecp ¼ ð1þ ÞI
Iþ ð1 tÞwl þ B :
Define
AðB; tÞ  ln ð1þ Þð1 tÞw
h
½Iþ ð1 tÞwl þ B
 
and
ZðtÞ  ln Ið1 tÞwh
 
:
Inserting the last four equations into (A.1) and manipulating terms, one




ð1 ÞAðB; tÞ þ ZðtÞ½ : ðA:2Þ
In turn, those parameters must be consistent with individual behavior
and the budget constraint of the government,
t wh þ ð1 Þwl  ¼ ð1 ÞB; ðA:3Þ
which is Equation (10) in LN. The fraction of successful children is equal
to the individual probability to be successful, ¼ p. In turn the latter is
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lneck þ s ¼ q
1 p ;
which corresponds to Equation (5) in LN. Substituting the last expression
in (6) and using the above definitions, one obtains




For given t, Equations (A.2) and (A.4) determine the equilibrium levels of
s and B. It is straightforward to verify that (A.2) entails a negative rela-
tionship between s and B, whereas that relationship is positive in (A.4).
The associated curves thus intersect once and that intersection corre-
sponds to the unique equilibrium of the model.
In order to derive the effect of a small increase of the tax rate, consider
















Iþ Bþ ð1 tÞwl
 
40:
In general, the effect of dt on the curve (A.4) is ambiguous. Thus, consider
the case where the tax rate is equal to the one that maximizes the tax
revenue. In an interior solution, a small change in the tax rate does not
change the tax revenue, which is given by the l.h.s. of (A.3). Hence, it does
not change (1)B. By Proposition 4 in LN, labor market performance 
decreases in t. Hence, a small increase in the tax rate decreases B in
equilibrium. Since the curve (A.2) shifts upwards in the (B, s)-plane fol-
lowing a small dt>0 and since that curve is downwards-sloping, it follows
that the equilibrium s must increase strictly. A standard continuity argu-
ment shows that the same applies in a sufficiently small interval around
the tax rate that maximizes the tax revenue. Q.E.D.
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